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ABSTRACT 
Software agents are seen as a promising technology for automating economic transactions as they can act autonomously on 
behalf of their human owners.  In open, decentralized markets with incomplete information and possibly non-cooperative 
behavior, bilateral price negotiations have been shown as an adequate mechanism for balancing out the individual interests 
and for achieving coordination. Automating bilateral price negotiations and embarking on a strategy require inherent 
knowledge of the environment, e.g. of the typical negotiation leeway or behavior on the respective marketplace. 
Based on findings on negotiation theory, this contribution introduces a measuring system for quantifying marketplace-related 
negotiation behavior which can be used as a base for automated decision-finding in price negotiations and realizing a 
concrete strategy.  The measuring system has been implemented in software agents and evaluated within a prototypical 
electronic marketplace.  Results show the effectiveness of the measuring system and that coordination of the market can be 
achieved. 
Keywords 
Software agent, price negotiation, marketplace-related behavior, coordination. 
STRATEGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKETPLACE-RELATED NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 
An automation of bilateral price negotiations by software agents requires a formal, microeconomic-based model for decision-
finding and action-choosing.  An estimation of the respective market environment, particularly of the marketplace-related 
negotiation behavior, is a requisite for a suitable selection of bargaining strategies in bilateral price negotiations.  Without 
such knowledge, the realization of negotiation strategies becomes impossible: If a merchant adds a flat-rate surcharge of 20% 
to his (realistic) aspiration, he can be regarded as a profiteer on one marketplace, whereas with this strategy he appears as a 
lucrative victim on another.  
While several formal concepts for the management of bilateral negotiations exist, there is a lack of appropriate concepts for 
the preceding negotiation opening phase, both in theory and in practice.  The knowledge of marketplace-related negotiation 
behavior is typically assumed as given in theory (e.g. as a game theoretical pay-off matrix), whereas in practice it has to be 
pre-determined by the human actor himself (e.g. Market Maker (Maes et al. 1999) or Avalanche (Eymann 2000)).   
Since the recognition of marketplace-related negotiation behavior has not yet been automated, it constitutes a gap for the 
complete automation of economic transactions, the significance of which increases constantly with progressive networking, 
miniaturization and mobility of the components of information systems.  The measuring of marketplace-related negotiation 
behavior thereby becomes an important issue for the opening of negotiations in open, decentralized marketplaces with 
incomplete information and possibly non-cooperative behavior.  Without solving this problem, it is not possible to adequately 
make any strategic decisions.  The measuring method presented and its integration into the negotiation strategy of software 
agents presents a first step in closing this gap. 
This contribution is compiled as follows:  In the first section, a measuring model for quantifying market-related negotiation 
behavior for commodity goods is presented based on statistical reference points of bilateral price negotiations.  In the second 
section, this method is integrated into a microeconomic model which is implemented into software agents.  The evaluation is 
performed in the third section with experiments in a prototypical electronic marketplace.  Both the effectiveness of the 
measuring method and the adaptability of the software agents’ negotiation behavior are demonstrated and it is shown that 
coordination of the market can be achieved with its implementation. 
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QUANTIFYING MARKETPLACE-RELATED NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 
Parameters for Quantifying the Opening of a Negotiation  
Price negotiations can generally be subdivided into two phases which require separate examination.  The first phase is the 
opening of the negotiation as part of the initiation phase of economic transactions. The second phase is the negotiation proper 
as part of the contract optimization or the agreement phase (Schmid 1993).  A complete automation of bilateral price 
negotiations is only possible when a formal, microeconomic-based model for their decision-finding and action-choosing can 
be implemented in both phases.  
The opening requires the fixing of the initial offers of both transaction partners, through which the extent of the negotiation 
leeway and the concrete form of the chosen strategies for the following price negotiation are determined.  The fundamental 
basis for this is the software agent’s aspiration1 as well as information about the concrete negotiation partner2 and the 
respective transaction environment, such as the previous marketplace’s events or the negotiated prices (Lewicki et al. 1997).  
The respective initial offers should be adjusted to the typical negotiation leeway of the respective transaction environment 
and turn out differently, depending on whether small margins are negotiated or whether the negotiation takes place on a kind 
of “oriental bazaar”. 
As promising parameters for a measuring system, static reference points of price negotiations, such as reservation price, 
aspiration or the partner’s initial offer, are suitable.  The consideration of these static reference points when determining an 
initial offer is positively linked with the negotiation outcome (Poucke/ Buelens 2001) and feature in competitive price 
negotiations (Lewicki et al. 1997).  Poucke and Buelens show in their experimental study that as much as 60% of the 
standard deviation of the negotiation results can be explained by static reference points, which are already fixed before the 
negotiation takes place.  This result is of special significance for the automation of bilateral price negotiations because static 
reference points are easy to quantify and allow a reduction of complexity for its integration into microeconomic decision 
models.  
The measuring method for marketplace-related negotiation behavior and leeway proposed in this contribution is thus based 
on historical, objectively quantifiable data of the respective marketplace, in particular on the initial offers and the realized 
transaction prices. Reviewing this data with statistical methods allows the actors (on the assumption that the market is 
relatively stable) a helpful forecast of the negotiation behavior to be expected in the future.  A further advantage is that it does 
not require complete information but can be used decentrally, based solely on the individual experiences made by particular 
actors.  
Measuring of the Marketplace-Related Negotiation Leeway 
While the absolute negotiation leeway during a concrete negotiation is of central importance, the quantification of 
marketplace-related negotiation behavior proposed here is based on relative quantities.  The relative negotiation leeway  of 
the negotiation i  is calculated ex post for both negotiation partners ( ) according to definition (1) and 
gives information about the deviation between initial offer  and realized transaction price .  
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If the economic plausible condition  is satisfied, it results in a relative negotiation leeway of the seller  
and of the buyer . 
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1 The aspiration constitutes the central determinant for negotiation success and is therefore the focus of negotiation theory.  
This connection has been evaluated by several studies and proven as significant for instance by the “Streaker” experiment in 
(Raiffa 1982) or (Poucke/ Buelens 2001).  
2 For anonymous negotiation methods typically found in markets, it is not possible to relate previous actions to individual 
actors. In the information phase of transactions, therefore, only indirect methods for information recovery can be used 
(Kersten/ Lo 2001). 
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The introduced ‘negotiation leeway’ quantity always relates to a singular, concrete negotiation. However, the aggregation of 
the negotiations carried out on a marketplace characterizes the negotiation behavior typical of a marketplace.  With its ex post 
measured relative negotiation leeway, each single negotiation then represents a single parameter value and can be used with 
statistical methods for a characterization of the marketplace as a whole.  From an economics aspect, on the assumption that 
all actors are acting rationally and that the deviation of the transaction prices is small,3 interdependency between the 
marketplace-related negotiation leeway and the market price is expected to exist.  Thus, a measuring method for quantifying 
the marketplace-related negotiation leeway should take this into account because it involves interesting information for the 
estimation of concrete negotiation situations.   
A first approximation for quantifying this interdependency is given by a linear function y = b + m x.  The seller’s negotiation 
leeway SL  dependent on the transaction price  can be calculated according to definition (2a) and analogously for the 
buyer 
Tp
B
L  according to definition (2b). 
TS pmbL 11 +≡  (2a) 
TB pmbL 22 +≡  (2b) 
Both parameters of the regression curve are calculated with the least-squares method.4  Taking the range of the individual 
negotiation leeway into account, the regression curves SL  and BL  are limited within the following values:  
{ }SS LL ,0max=  (3a) 
{ }{ }1,min,0max BB LL =  (3b) 
These ex post calculated parameter values for sellers’ relative leeway are shown in figure 1 where each dot represents a 
successfully concluded transaction and its corresponding relative negotiation leeway . The buyers’ relative negotiation 
leeway  is shown in figure 2.5 The regression curves representing the marketplace-related negotiation behavior in the form 
of the negotiation leeway of the sellers  and of the buyers  conditional upon the transaction price are additionally 
plotted.   
S
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The presented measuring of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior is designed as an independent generic module, 
which can basically be considered in every microeconomic negotiation model and negotiation strategy. On the basis of this 
simple calculation method, the measuring system is suitable for the aspired automation of bilateral price negotiations and for 
the implementation into software agents. Furthermore, the measuring system could be implemented as a basic service on 
electronic marketplaces for giving new software agents an idea about the marketplace-related negotiation behavior. 
 
                                                          
3 On markets for commodities with high market transparency, the deviation of transaction prices is usually small. 
4 For calculating the regression curve the software agents need at least two different transaction prices. 
5 All figures are based on a sample of parameter values presented in detail in (Sackmann 2003). 
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Figure 1. Marketplace-related negotiation leeway (seller) 
 
 
Figure 2. Marketplace-related negotiation leeway (buyer) 
 
INTEGRATING THE MEASURING SYSTEM INTO NEGOTIATION STRATEGY 
The measuring method for quantifying marketplace-related negotiation leeway has been developed with the aim of formally 
describing the essential characteristics of marketplaces and thus providing a prognosis tool for decision-finding in price 
negotiations.  Based on the assumption that the negotiation behavior on a marketplace is not completely unaffected by 
previously observed negotiation behavior, the ex post calculated parameter values can be used at the beginning of a concrete 
negotiation for the prognosis of the negotiation behavior expected and therefore as a basis for the determination of the initial 
offers and the concrete negotiation.  
The database for the measuring method are the previously realized transactions on the respective marketplace and, for its use, 
it is primarily immaterial where this information comes from.6  In the following heuristic behavior model, the problem of 
information procurement is not expounded upon and the availability of data is seen as given, at least from the actor’s own 
negotiation history. 
                                                          
6 Whether a previous transaction on a marketplace has at all taken place is normally of minor significance in practice. (Raiffa 
1982) shows that even in such cases agreements can be usually reached.  Simulations furthermore show that software agents 
with randomly chosen reservation prices are able to negotiate successfully as long as a positive negotiation leeway exists 
(Eymann et al. 2003). 
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In this section, a microeconomic decision model for price negotiations is presented which firstly comes from an actor 
behaving in accordance with the respective marketplace.  Any number of variations can be derived from this ‘prototypical’ 
strategy.  A seller becomes able to fix a high initial offer by multiplying the difference between his aspiration and the 
calculated initial offer typical of the marketplace.  Though for such an operation he needs a concrete idea of the marketplace-
related negotiation behavior.  
Initial Offer  
The opening of a bilateral price negotiation as a rule occurs by communicating an initial offer.  The fundament for the 
determination of its value is formed by the introduced prognosis-tool for the marketplace-related negotiation behavior or, to 
be precise, by using the estimated regression curves. By transforming definition (1), the initial offers can be calculated as 
follows: 
( )STSSI Lplp +=≡ 1, 211 )1( TT pmpb ⋅++=  (4a) 
( )BTBBI Lplp −=≡ 1, 222 )1( TT pmpb ⋅−−=  (4b) 
The initial offer corresponding to the marketplace-related negotiation behavior can then be calculated by equating the 
transaction price with the ex ante fixed aspiration  ( ) and putting into the equation for calculating the 
marketplace-related negotiation leeway (3).  
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Counter-Offer versus Termination 
After receiving an initial offer, the opposing actor has to decide whether he should enter into negotiation or search for an 
alternative negotiation partner.  This decision depends on the interpretation of the initial offer received, which depends on the 
interpreting actor’s preferences, reservation price, aspiration and idea of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior. In this 
section, different possibilities for using the marketplace-related negotiation behavior for interpreting initial offers are 
discussed and suitable reactions in accordance with the pursued strategy are shown. 
After receiving an initial offer, it has to be decided whether to accept it immediately, whether to break off the negotiation or 
whether to open the negotiation by communicating an initial counter-offer.  The easiest case is given when the initial offer 
received is better than the actor’s aspiration, i.e. when the condition  ( ) is satisfied.  For the other cases, 
an interpretation of the initial offer received is necessary.  For the calculation of the expected opposing static reference points, 
the regression curves are reverted to and the step ‘calculating an initial offer’ is firstly inverted, i.e. the quadratic equation (4) 
formally solved for the expected transaction price. The seller calculates the expected transaction price   and the expected 
aspiration of his opponent  on the basis of definition (5) and conditional upon the received initial offer of the 
buyer :7  
SABI pp ,, ≥ BASI pp ,, ≤
*Tp
*,BAp
BIp ,
2
,2
2
2
2
2*,*
)(2
1
)(2
1
m
p
m
b
m
bpp
BI
BAT
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−⋅
−±
−⋅
−
−=≡  (5) 
Depending on the aspiration, the buyer can distinguish between three economic-related cases: 
Case 1: : The initial offer of the seller is lower than the buyer’s aspiration. The buyer should directly accept the 
seller’s offer.  
BASI pp ,, ≤
Case 2: : The expected seller’s aspiration is lower than the buyer’s aspiration.  A simple negotiation can be 
expected in which both negotiation partners can reach a price better than their aspiration.  The negotiation should be opened 
with a counter-offer.  
BASA pp ,*, ≤
Case 3: : The expected seller’s aspiration is higher than the buyer’s aspiration.  A hard negotiation can be 
expected in which a successful transaction can only be reached if at least one of the negotiation partners deviates from his 
BASA pp ,*, >
                                                          
7 The buyer can calculate the expected values accordingly.  From an economics view, only those solutions are valid that are 
higher than the initial offer received (Raiffa 1982) and satisfy the condition . *,, BABI pp ≤
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original aspiration.  In this case, a decision is necessary as to whether the negotiation should be broken off or if a counter-
offer should be made.  This decision can only be made in relation to the concrete transaction environment and requires a 
corresponding analysis and evaluation. One suitable formal method therefore is given by the measuring of the marketplace-
related negotiation behavior and the reference points derived from it. While the measuring method can be used for the 
analysis of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior independent of the actor’s concrete strategy, its consideration in the 
decision for a concrete negotiation is no longer possible independent of strategy.  
The measuring of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior offers no explicit strategy recommendation but can be used 
within different strategies for fixing the value of the counter-offer.  Hence, it is not possible to demonstrate the method in 
general. Therefore, it is illustrated by the very well-known ‘tit for tat’ strategy (Axelrod 1984): With a ‘tit for tat’ reaction on 
a received initial offer, the counter-offer that corresponds to the expected transaction price (aspiration) is sought after. The 
calculation of the counter-offer is based on the equation (6): 
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The expected transaction price  is then equated with the aspiration  (with ). The counter-offer is calculated 
as follows: 
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 (7b) 
There are a number of other strategies for fixing the value of counter-offers that differ in their particular consideration of the 
marketplace-related negotiation behavior and also require an appropriate examination of the attainability of a satisfactory 
negotiation outcome.  
EVALUATION OF THE MEASURING SYSTEM WITH A MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM 
The evaluation of the measuring method proposed has been carried out by its integration into software agents in the form of a 
heuristic negotiation strategy and by sending them onto a prototypical electronic marketplace. The software used for the 
simulations carried out is based on the multi-agent system ‘B2BOS’8 that has been developed at the Institute of Computer 
Science & Social Studies at the University of Freiburg.  It has been introduced with several publications, e.g. (Eymann 2002), 
(Padovan et al. 2002).  
The software agents implemented for the evaluation of the measuring method have a heuristically-adaptive strategy for their 
price-finding which is oriented on the work of (Cliff 1997), (Preist/ Tol 1998) and on the so-called ‘variation-imitation-
decision’ model of (Brenner 1999). This strategy offers several starting points for an integration of the measuring method 
presented.9 For checking and adapting the idea of current market prices, the software agents use any price information they 
can get through successfully terminated or abandoned negotiations. The adaptation is then realized by a modified ‘derivative-
following’ strategy (Greenwald/ Kephart 2001). Thus, the software agents adopt their idea of the actual market price after 
successful negotiations by equating the realized transaction price with the idea of the actual market price assuming that this 
price can be realized again.  In the case of abandoned negotiations, the last counter-offer at which the transaction could have 
been successfully terminated enters the actual market price concept, weighted with a factor fixed in the software agent’s 
strategy. This kind of adaptation corresponds to a ‘trial and error’ action and performs an incremental change of the 
parameter value after each negotiation.  
For evaluating the functionality and consequences of the measuring method, the execution of several simulation series is 
described in the following sections. The quality of the measuring system is analyzed and evaluated within the intentionally 
simply kept simulation environment. Firstly, the simulation of a reference scenario without use of the measuring method is 
described. Secondly, the functionality of the measuring system is checked by its implementation in a single agent and thirdly 
8 http://b2bos.sourceforge.net. 
9 The used strategic parameters are described in (Eymann 2002). 
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the consequences of using the measuring system by all software agents on the coordination of the whole system are 
investigated.  
Reference scenario without use of measuring method 
The reference scenario is set up as follows: Twelve software agents are brought in on each side of the market, fixing their 
initial offers moderately above their concept of the market price. Buyers are started with the idea of buying for 30 units, 
sellers with an idea of selling for 40 units. The reservation prices of the buyers, just as sellers, are chosen in such a way that 
for each negotiation a positive leeway exists. Figure 3 shows an exemplary simulation run. Every dot represents a 
successfully terminated transaction (713 transactions were successfully terminated, the average transaction price came to 
35.21 units with a standard derivation of 0.98). 
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Figure 3. Development of the price (reference scenario) 
All simulations carried out have shown that on a macroeconomic level the expected coordination of the system can be 
reached and occurs emergently from the sole direct interaction of the software agents. It is not promoted by any central 
component.  
Integration of the Measuring Method into Software Agents 
In a second step, the functionality of the measuring system itself and its integration into the negotiation behavior of the 
software agents is evaluated. This evaluation is made on the basis of three scenarios. Firstly, it is shown that the measuring 
system can be used decentrally without fully informed software agents and that it reflects the real negotiation behavior 
observed on the macroeconomic level. Secondly, it is shown that, by using the implemented measuring system, a single 
software agent is able to adapt its negotiation behavior to a formerly unknown marketplace-related negotiation behavior and 
can thus increase its economic success. Thirdly, it is shown that the coordination on the marketplace can still be reached 
when all software agents use the measuring system and that this does not result in a break-down of coordination. 
Decentralized use of the Measuring System 
The first simulation run for reviewing the functionality of the measuring system by using it decentrally and without fully 
informed software agents corresponds in its configuration to the introduced reference scenario. Merely one of the 12 buyer 
agents uses the measuring system. This software agent acts as long as the other software agents until it has enough 
transaction experience for calculating the regression curve. After that, it changes its negotiation behavior in two aspects: 
Firstly, the initial offers are calculated by the method introduced above. Secondly, the value of the counter-offer is no longer 
independent of the initial offer received. The received initial offer also influences both the reaction and the fixing of the 
counter-offer. 
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If the available data is exclusively derived from the transaction history of a single buyer agent,10 it is not possible to directly 
estimate the marketplace-related total negotiation behavior of the buyers through one single buyer and thus this side of the 
market cannot be adequately estimated without additional information.11 However, the opposite side of the market can be 
estimated directly. Figure 4 shows three ‘snapshots’ which represent the estimated regression curve regarding the negotiation 
behavior of the sellers by a buyer. The unbroken lineis calculated by taking all negotiations on the marketplace into account. 
The slashed line represents the negotiation behavior and is based exclusively on buyers’ own negotiation history. The clear 
approximation of the results of the decentralized measurement with incomplete information to the results of the centralized 
measurement was observable in all simulation runs carried out. 
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Figure 4. Decentralized versus centralized measurement of the marketplace-related negotiation leeway 
The measurement method proposed consequently offers the possibility to conclude from the aspiration of the partner and the 
transaction price to be expected from an initial offer received. The estimation of the transaction price to be expected and its 
consideration in the individual negotiation strategy lead to a positive effect on the software agents negotiation effort, thus 
significantly less negotiations are abandoned and less negotiation is needed for reaching successful agreements. 
Adaptation of the Negotiation Strategy by Using the Measurement Method 
For the second simulation run, two software agents with differing parameter settings are started with the aim of evaluating 
their adaptation behavior. These software agents enter a marketplace with a ‘wrong’ idea of marketplace-related negotiation 
behavior,12 though one software agent is started with the measuring system integrated, while the control agent is started 
without it.  
In figure 5, a further simulation run is shown.13 The dark points represent the transaction prices realized on the marketplace. 
The bright points directly below represent the initial offers of the ‘typical’ buyers. The initial offers of the modified software 
agent using the measuring system are marked in with black triangles. The initial offers of the control agent are marked in 
with grey rhombuses. At the beginning, the behavior of the modified software agents is identical and there is no difference in 
the size of their initial offers. After 50 seconds, the modified software agent has collected enough (at minimum two) 
parameter values and starts to use its ‘measured idea’ of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior for adapting its own 
negotiation behavior and for setting its initial offers. 
                                                          
10 All following findings can be transferred analogously to seller agents.  
11 The negotiation behavior of the other buyers can only be indirectly observed and estimated. For a more detailed discussion 
of the arising lock in-effects and possible countermeasures, see (Sackmann 2003).  
12 In the simulation, the marketplace-related negotiation leeway is 15%. The buyer agents with the ‘wrong’ idea take 55% as 
their starting point and are thus fixing their initial offers ‘extremely’ low in comparison with the other buyers.  
13 The stabilization of the market price occurs on different levels depending on the simulation run. This can be explained by 
the heterogeneity of the software agents’ parameter settings regarding their concessions and also by the ‘extreme’ initial 
offers (Sackmann 2003).  
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Figure 5. Adjustment of initial offers to the marketplace-related negotiation leeway 
The analysis of the simulation runs furthermore shows that the modified software agent requires less negotiation steps and 
successfully concludes more transactions than the control agent. Thus, the simulation results anticipate that the use of the 
proposed measuring system also offers a possibility of realizing an automated estimation of the transaction environment for 
software agents or services in open systems.    
Integration of the Measuring System into all Software Agents 
In the last simulation run, the focus is directed on the macroeconomic level. The effect the use of the measuring system has 
on the coordination of an electronic marketplace when all software agents are using it is evaluated. The simulations carried 
out generally show that also in this scenario the coordination of the software agents also occurs emergently and that the 
software agents get used to each other’s way of negotiation and therefore generate a marketplace-related negotiation behavior 
only by their bilateral interaction.  
A further example of the self-coordination of the software agents is shown in figure 6. This simulation has been carried out 
with the same parameter setting as the simulation above. On the basis of its first executed transactions, one of the buyer 
forms a ‘wrong’ estimation of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior and hence starts to fix ‘untypical’ initial offers. 
After several failed trials, it succeeds both in correcting its estimation and adapting its negotiation behavior to that of the 
other software agents. With ongoing simulation, a stable marketplace-related negotiation behavior ensues.  
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Figure 6. Example of self-coordination 
The simulation results anticipate that with the consideration of marketplace-related negotiation behavior by the software 
agents, the coordination of the electronic marketplace is not at risk. Furthermore, the provision of the information about the 
marketplace-related negotiation behavior could be offered as a service of the marketplace itself and therefore give new 
software agents a chance for a faster adaptation of their negotiation behavior and a chance to realize their individual 
negotiation strategy.  
Simulation Results and Interpretation 
The simulations presented show that the proposed measuring method can be used decentrally and without full information for 
the estimation of the marketplace-related negotiation behavior of the opposite side of the market. It also offers the possibility 
of automated recognition of the negotiation behavior on an electronic marketplace and with respective consideration, the 
negotiation behavior of software agents can be adapted to the marketplace-related negotiation behavior.  
CONCLUSION 
The automated execution of bilateral price negotiations by software agents requires a general concept that includes both the 
conducting of negotiations and an automated adaptation of the negotiation strategy to the concrete transaction environment. 
The measuring system presented constitutes an independent modular unit for automatically measuring the ‘typical’ 
negotiation behavior of a marketplace and can be integrated into every negotiation strategy. It can be implemented into 
software agents and allows them to quantify the marketplace-related negotiation behavior. The integration of the measuring 
method into a microeconomic behavior model is exemplified with a heuristically-adaptive negotiation strategy.  
The experimental results presented are strictly seen as no formal proof of the interdependence between the integration of the 
measuring method and the economic success of the software agents but it is to be expected that it improves the possibilities 
of software agents’ use in open systems. The recognition of marketplace-related negotiation behavior and the adaptation of 
the negotiation strategy are of special significance especially in the context of mobile use of information technology because 
the transaction environment can constantly change through a change in location of the services offered and demanded. On the 
basis of the relatively simple calculation and thus the low additional demands on the arithmetic capacity required, the 
measuring method is predestined for use in the context of mobile information technology with its limited capacities of end-
devices. 
The requests arising through the technical development for an automated execution of economic transactions and the 
presented results of the experimental simulations give cause for further research. The next step would be a testing outside the 
experimental environment and to evaluate its reliability. Therefore, it is planned to integrate the independent measuring 
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module into other negotiation strategies and to use it in practical application as part of the CatNet and EMIKA projects.14 Last 
but not least, the transferability of the measuring method onto other market-based coordination mechanisms, e.g. for 
measuring the marketplace-related bidding behavior in auctions, is a possible subject of further research. 
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14 The CatNet project is supported by the EU and evaluates the decentralized coordination of software agents in dynamic 
application layer networks (http://www.telematik.uni-freiburg.de). The EMIKA project is supported by the German Research 
Foundation and evaluates decentral coordination with software agents in hospitals in real-time (Sackmann et al. 2002).  
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